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Relations between religion and politics are products of history, not theory. 
In the United States, both religious doctrine and constitutional law provide 
normative frameworks for resolving particular questions about church 
and state, but the enduring patterns are set by a more complex interaction 
of law, philosophy, and faith that reflects the distinctive circumstances 
of American history and continues to shape contemporary politics.1) 
Today, Americans are more likely to attend worship and express religious 
commitments than the citizens of other developed democracies, but their 
laws and practices enforce a more rigorous separation of church and 
state than we find in more secular European cultures. While American 
politicians articulate religious beliefs and values with an openness that 
would seem out of place in Europe, American citizens often express a 
religious skepticism about politics that is even stronger than secular 
European suspicion of politically active religion. These differences 
reflect the historical fact that American ideas about religion and politics 
were decisively shaped by the Enlightenment and the Protestant 
Reformation, while America largely avoided the conflict between Catholic 
Christendom and modern secularism that was so important in Europe 
during the nineteenth century. Both secularism and Catholicism are, of 
course, important parts of American life today, but to understand both 
constitutional law and religious life in their distinctly American forms, we 
1 ) This essay originated in a lecture delivered at International Christian University 
on June 12, 2013. I am grateful to the faculty and students at ICU for their warm 
reception on that occasion, and for this opportunity to develop the themes of 
that lecture.
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must look to an earlier set of questions about faith and reason that settlers 
in the eighteenth century brought with them from many parts of Europe to 
the English colonies along the Atlantic seaboard. 
Constitution
The delegates from the thirteen newly independent states who met in 
Philadelphia in 1789 to draw up a constitution for the United States shared 
the attitudes and values of enlightened Europeans of their day. They had 
successfully separated themselves from Great Britain politically, but they 
drew heavily on the ideas of the English philosopher John Locke to shape 
the new government. Like Locke, most of them assumed that religion is 
primarily a matter of ideas that individuals hold about God, morality, 
and salvation, rather than a body of doctrine maintained by a church. 
Locke had argued that because law has no power over these matters of 
conscience, the appropriate relationship between government and religion 
is one of tolerance—prescribing no beliefs, endorsing no religion, and 
accepting whatever faith a citizen happens to hold.2)
   This was a relatively new idea, even in America. Several of the former 
British colonies had state-supported churches, and this continued for at least 
50 years after the American Revolution in the state of Connecticut.3) By the 
time of the revolution, however, most states had ended any official support 
for their churches, and by 1789, most American leaders, including the 
religious leaders, would have said that a state church is a bad idea. Far more 
important was the right to religious freedom, and when Congress drew up 
the first ten amendments to the constitution to provide a Bill of Rights, the 
First Amendment made that freedom a matter of fundamental law;
2 ) John Locke, “A Letter Concerning Toleration,” in Richard Vernon, ed., John 
Locke on Toleration (Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy; Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 3-46. In practice, Locke’s ideas about 
toleration, which he did not extend to atheists or to Roman Catholics, were 
more restrictive than his theory might suggest. 
3 ) Mark A. Noll, A History of Christianity in the United States and Canada (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1992), 144-148.
Religion and Politics in America: Constitution, Culture, and Theology 89
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom 
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.4)
In a characteristically Enlightenment way, the First Amendment links 
religious freedom to other important individual rights, especially rights in 
relation to the government. So alongside the prohibition on government 
interference with ideas and their expression, the Amendment insists that 
government must not recognize a church that citizens are required to 
support or encouraged to join, nor can it endorse any set of religious 
beliefs or practices.
   It was at that time that Americans began to think in terms of “the 
separation of church and state.” Those words are often used as a summary 
of the American idea of religious freedom, and they are held up as an ideal 
by dissidents in many parts of the world who see the requirements of 
religion and the power of government too closely linked in their own 
countries. The phrase may have originated in a letter written to a group of 
Baptists in Danbury, Connecticut, by President Thomas Jefferson in 1802. 
Jefferson’s enlightened version of Christianity often got him labeled as an 
“atheist” by more orthodox Christians, especially those in the New 
England states who also disagreed with his politics. But he found a point 
of agreement with the Connecticut Baptists, who were struggling against 
the official recognition that their state still gave to its Congregational 
churches, and when Jefferson wrote about a “a wall of separation between 
church and state,” he was imagining a structure that both Enlightened 
reason and Anabaptist piety wanted to see built as high and as solid as 
possible.5)
4 ) “Bill of Rights,” Accessed December 10, 2013, http://www.archives.gov/
exhibits/charters/bill_of_rights.html 
5 ) “Jefferson’s Letter to the Danbury Baptists,” accessed December 9, 2013, http://
www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/9806/danpre.html. Although the First Amendment rule 
against established religion was already in force when Jefferson wrote his letter 
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   Like the renunciation of war in the Japanese Constitution, the 
“separation of church and state” has become a fundamental part of 
American constitutional identity. Such constitutional principles, however, 
are both symbols of identity and loci for contested interpretations. In the 
American case, the ambiguity is compounded by the fact that the words 
themselves do not occur in the constitutional documents. The American 
people do not “separate” church and state in the literal way that the 
Japanese people renounce war. Instead, they impose on their legislature 
two restrictions—one against establishing religion and the other against 
prohibiting its free exercise. The limits thus set are wide, and Americans 
argue constantly about what those two constitutional provisions mean and 
how each one is related to the other. Is the government establishing 
religion if it provides education by supporting schools that are run by 
churches? Is the government establishing religion if it allows prayers at 
public ceremonies or sets up a Christmas display on public property? Is 
the government interfering with the free exercise of religion if it requires 
church supported medical centers to provide birth control or abortion 
advice? Is the government interfering with the free exercise of religion if it 
requires church property to conform to local building codes or if it 
prohibits discrimination when churches hire their employees? Is the 
government establishing religion when it provides chaplains for its 
soldiers, or is it restricting free exercise when it fails to provide them for its 
prisoners? All of those questions continue to appear in various forms in 
American life, and no simple statement about “separation of church and 
state” will resolve them. The basic framework of the constitutional 
requirements, however, has remained stable from the beginning, and it is 
unlikely to change in the future. The questions of law about the meaning 
of “establishment of religion” and “free exercise” are very important 
questions to the people who are involved in these cases, but they do not 
in 1802, the prohibition was understood at the time to apply only to the Federal 
government, not to individual states. Only after the American Civil War in the 
mid-nineteenth century was it settled that the prohibition also applied to the 
states.
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change the general terms on which religion is part of American life. To 
understand church and state, we should look to the interactions between 
theology, culture, and politics, rather than to the questions before the 
courts.
Culture
The “wall of separation” that Jefferson had in mind was primarily 
intended to protect the individual conscience from intrusions by the 
power of the state. For the Enlightened leaders who met in Philadelphia 
to draw up the constitution, religion was best understood as a set of ideas 
held by individuals. People are religious, according to this Enlightenment 
understanding, because they have individually become convinced that 
the propositions set forth in scripture or in religious traditions are true, 
much as they might become convinced of the truth of Newton’s physics or 
Locke’s epistemology. On this model, a church is a voluntary association 
of people who happen to hold the same religious ideas, not a community 
of faith whose worship and sacraments are essential to salvation or a 
tradition whose continuity is essential to the transmission of religious 
truth.
   This Enlightenment individualism is quite different from our 
contemporary psychological and sociological understandings of the ways 
that people acquire their ideas and commitments and the ways that 
communities and societies hold themselves together. The Enlightenment 
understanding was perhaps also quite different from the reality of 
American life at the time. While church participation was relatively low at 
the time of the American Revolution, many Americans were formed by the 
religious culture of Puritan New England, the independent, local 
communities of Presbyterians in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, or the 
aristocratic Anglicanism of Virginia. Many of the political leaders at the 
constitutional convention were committed to their own Christian 
denominations, and others participated in the character-forming rituals of 
Masonic lodges, instead of or in addition to those of the Christian 
churches. Those who lived through the American Revolution also 
92
developed strong local patriotic cultures in the places where they lived. 
The Revolution was a long war, lasting at least fifteen years from the first 
skirmishes to the final peace treaty, and the many British Loyalists who 
fled to Canada or returned to England would testify to the growing power 
of the civic commitments that drove them from Boston, New York, or 
Philadelphia during those years.
   The question was whether these various religious, fraternal, civic, and 
philosophical commitments could be brought together into a national 
culture and community that would encompass the thirteen new states 
along the Atlantic coast as well as the thinly scattered settlements across 
the interior. At the end of the American Revolution in 1783, it was not at all 
clear that this would happen. But perhaps by the time of national 
mourning that followed George Washington’s death in 1799 and certainly 
by the time Americans began to speak in the 1840s of their “manifest 
destiny” to occupy the continent and lead the world, America did create a 
civic culture with its own mythology, its recognized saints and heroes, and 
its annual calendar of celebrations.6) This civic culture was severely tested 
by the American Civil War in the 1860s, but it emerged from that conflict 
with a new set of myths and heroes, especially Abraham Lincoln himself, 
and a new sense of its place in the history of the world.
   So while the United States was consolidating a constitutional system 
that prohibited state support for any one of the many churches, it was in 
some ways, unofficially and alongside those churches, creating a cultural 
system that had many of the characteristics of a religion. The sociologist 
Robert Bellah has, in fact, called this patriotic tradition the “American civil 
religion.”7) From the beginning, it has existed alongside the more readily 
recognizable religious traditions in America—first alongside the many 
different forms of Christianity and the small Jewish community that had 
been present almost from the beginning, and then alongside the growing 
6 ) Nathan Hatch, The Democratization of American Christianity (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1989). 
7 ) Robert Bellah, “American Civil Religion,” Daedalus 96 (1967): 1-21.
Religion and Politics in America: Constitution, Culture, and Theology 93
number of African, Islamic, Buddhist, Hindu, Sikh, and other traditions 
that are now represented in the American population. People from all of 
these traditions may participate in the American civil religion, Bellah says, 
without any sense of divided loyalty. The civil religion is, of course, 
heavily influenced by the virtues and values of the Christian traditions 
that have been prominent in American history, and some other traditions 
are wary of this pervasive Christian influence. But if the civil religion is 
often shaped by Christianity, it also imposes constraints on Christianity 
and the other religious traditions that have become part of American 
society. Government may not be allowed to limit the free exercise of 
religion, but civil religion frames certain public expectations about the way 
religious life will be conducted. No law forbids aggressive proselytizing, 
or denigrating other religions, just as no law requires religious 
communities to affirm their patriotism simultaneously with their 
affirmations of faith. But civil religion creates a strong expectation that 
religious communities will exercise their freedom in accordance with these 
norms, however much they may otherwise differ in belief, culture, and 
history.
   Civil religion also connects religion and patriotism in ways that are 
sometimes a bit shocking, even to European Christians who are quite 
familiar with the idea of a national church. Visitors to America are often 
surprised to find that the flag of the United States has a prominent place in 
the sanctuary of many churches. Despite the constitutional separation of 
church and state, most Americans do not find this presence of a symbol of 
the state near the center of the church’s worship strange. Indeed, it is so 
familiar that most of them do not even notice it. Of course, there are 
theological problems with this, as many American Christians would 
recognize upon reflection; but the interesting thing is how in this matter as 
in many others, civil religion permeates the practices of American religion, 
all without any legal status or indeed any formal institutional existence at 
all. It is impossible to understand church and state in America without 
understanding that this cultural establishment of religion sits quite 
comfortably in the minds of many Americans alongside the legal 
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separation of church and state. This is a logical contradiction that would 
surely have troubled Jefferson and the enlightened thinkers who created 
the American constitutional system, but it is an inescapable part of 
American life.
Church or Sect?
So there is a political tradition of Enlightenment individualism in the 
United States, and there is a civil religion that is uniquely the product of 
American culture. Both of these influence relationships between church 
and state, but the role of religion in American life is also strongly 
influenced by two different theological understandings of how the 
Christian community relates to society. One view, which acquired a 
prominence in America that it never achieved in the European lands where 
it originated, sprang from small Christian groups that stood apart from the 
Protestant state churches that emerged in Germany, England and 
Scandinavia. These groups emphasized the fellowship of local 
congregations and often distrusted the clerical leadership of larger church 
bodies. As a result, they were often excluded from participation in politics 
or chose to withdraw themselves from it.  Sociologically, their 
characteristics were described by Max Weber and Ernst Troeltsch.8) They 
were ascetic in their practices and thrifty in their habits, with high 
standards for their membership and limited outreach into the wider 
society. This sectarian Protestantism was often persecuted in the European 
lands where it originated, even when the rulers and authorities were 
themselves Protestant. Its adherents see themselves as witnesses against 
the abuses that always accompany political power, and they regard all 
politics with suspicion.
   Another view prevailed in regions where Protestant leadership 
8 ) See Max Weber, “The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism,” in H. H. 
Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max Weber (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1946), 302-322; Ernst Troeltsch, The Social Teaching of the Christian 
Churches, 2 vols. (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1992), 328-343, 691-
730.
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supplanted the Catholic hierarchy and allied itself with secular rulers or, 
indeed, provoked a civil revolution to complement the ecclesiastical reform. 
Here, what Troeltsch would call the “church-type” persisted, with its aim 
to encompass the whole society and all its relationships. Especially in the 
Calvinist or “Reformed” Protestantism that took hold in Geneva, Scotland, 
the Netherlands, and among the Puritan revolutionaries in England, this 
church saw itself as the vanguard of a transformation that would bring 
society as whole into conformity with Christian expectations in a way that 
no previous Christian era had achieved. For these communities, secular 
authority is more than a necessary source of order. Political relationships 
provide a tool that can be used for redemptive purposes.
   These theological alternatives are older than the events that provide the 
founding stories for American civil religion and older than the 
Enlightenment origins of American constitutional law. Indeed, it may 
seem that they belong to a past that few contemporary Americans would 
know, except perhaps for well informed members of the religious groups 
that trace their origins to these sixteenth century arguments. Nevertheless, 
the influence of this past on American attitudes is pervasive. It arguably 
runs much deeper than either Enlightenment law or civil religion, and it 
accounts for much of what is distinctive in American politics. The lines of 
division in American politics are not between Left and Right, nor between 
secular and religious, but between Reformers and Sectarians. What makes 
America the most religious nation in the developed world is not that its 
people go to church more than other people do, but that they see their 
politics in these religious terms. By comparison to this American political 
theology, all European politics is intensely secular, as is politics in Japan 
and in the other developed democracies of Asia. Europe and Japan are 
secular and enlightened. America is, as the British writer G. K. Chesterton 
said, “The nation with the soul of a church.”9)
   Or perhaps we should say that America is a nation that is always trying 
9 ) G. K. Chesterton, “What I Saw in America,” in Collected Works, vol. 21 (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1990), 45.
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to decide whether its soul is the soul of a church or the soul of a sect. What 
makes the United States different from many countries with long Christian 
traditions is that many of its Christian denominations have their origin in 
the dissenting groups that broke away from the dominant Anglican, 
Lutheran, or Reformed churches within a century or two after the 
Reformation. Mennonites, Brethren, and Amish grew and prospered in 
America, where there was open space for them to build their alternative 
Christian communities. Methodists and Baptists, minorities in their 
European homelands, became the largest American Protestant 
denominations during the nineteenth century, and although these 
churches became familiar and accepted parts of American life, many of 
them continued to see themselves as witnesses against a corrupt society 
long after they had entered the cultural mainstream.
   These groups prized their independence and regarded any ties between 
church and state with suspicion. As we have seen, Jefferson did not coin 
that phrase about a “wall of separation” between church and state for 
Enlightenment legislators. He was writing to a group of Baptists in 
Danbury, Connecticut.
   Such independent, evangelical Protestant groups made themselves at 
home in the new atmosphere of religious freedom that found expression 
in the First Amendment. Their congregations were centers of mutual 
assistance, only loosely bound to hierarchies and doctrine. They had 
none of the old sense of responsibility for a geographical parish that 
characterized Anglican churches on both sides of the Atlantic and the 
established Congregational churches of New England. These Methodists, 
Baptists, and other independents tended to see their churches standing 
against the surrounding culture, rather than as part of it.
   One reason for America’s ability to assimilate waves of Lutheran, 
Catholic, and Jewish immigrants during the nineteenth century was that 
this sectarian model of local identity and legal tolerance was adopted by 
new groups as they arrived.10) Like the Methodists, Baptists, and 
10) Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 
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Mennonites before them, they found that the emphasis on local community 
and the independence from legal regulation suited their needs. Most 
accepted the American model at the level of their local congregations, even 
if their hierarchy resisted it at the level of doctrine. From a sociological 
perspective, Catholics, Orthodox Christians, Jews, and now Muslims have 
all become Baptists on their way to becoming Americans. They absorbed 
the attitudes and values that gave them a sense of independence from 
society and its institutions. Their religious identity became part of their 
sense of American individualism. Religious diversity poses few problems 
for America because sectarian religions do not compete to define the 
national identity.
   One thing that goes with these sectarian values, however, is a suspicion 
of politics and government. Government may be necessary, but it should 
be kept small, and the best way to live your own life is to stay beyond its 
reach. These attitudes may seem unrealistic in the world of the modern 
welfare state, but they are deeply embedded in American thinking. This 
provides at least a partial explanation for the movement in American 
politics today that rejects government regulation of financial markets and 
government participation in health care, despite the evidence that non-
governmental solutions have not worked for these problems.
   Sometimes, then, America is a nation with the soul of a sect. It believes 
that what is most important in life and faith is incompatible with the 
compromises and coercion that are essential to participation in political 
life. Not all Americans who share this way of thinking would recognize its 
history. Many of them would not think of themselves as particularly 
religious. But the suspicion of government that reappears whenever there 
are large changes in American politics grows from religious history, not 
from political ideologies.   
1969), 450. “Though Americans are divided into very many sects, they all see 
their religion in the same light.”
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Transformation
Sectarianism is not all there is to American political theology, however. 
There are others who see politics as the instrument of social transformation. 
For these Americans, the nation has indeed the soul of a church, and not 
a sect. It has the soul of a church in the sense that religion gives life to 
the political body, transforming it into an anticipation of the kingdom of 
God. In the American context, this is more than the idea of an established 
church that would maintain moral order and assist the state in the task of 
suppressing evil. The English Puritans who went to Massachusetts were 
not content to reform the Church of England. They wanted to build a holy 
commonwealth that they had been unable to create at home.
   As with the sectarian vision, this idea of social transformation has not 
remained the sole property of its original authors. In fact, in recent 
American politics, the most interesting development has been the adoption 
of these transformative ideas of politics by those who come from churches 
with a sectarian, individualist heritage. Baptists and independent, 
evangelical congregations have been the main source of membership and 
leadership for the movement that is often called “the new religious 
right.”11) The political label, however, is misleading. For conservative 
Protestants, what is new here is not a political program that we could label 
“right” or “left.” What is new is that these Christians now see politics as an 
instrument that people of faith can use to ensure that God’s will is done.
   For them, this is a new way of thinking about politics, and it is a change 
in thinking that has generated many changes in American political life in 
recent decades. The emphasis for the new religious right is frankly on 
winning, rather than on witness. The new message is that it is not 
necessary to stand on the margins of society as a witness to a different way 
of life. If people want society to live by higher moral standards, they 
should put their energies into organizing and voting.
   In the early days of the movement, its leaders called it “The Moral 
11) Clyde Wilcox, God’s Warriors: The Christian Right in Twentieth-Century America 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991).
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Majority,” but it was the conservative political strategist Ralph Reed, 
director of an organization called the Christian Coalition, who had the key 
political insight: In a democracy where most people do not vote, you do 
not need a moral majority.12) A well-organized minority will do. It does not 
take 51% of the adult population to change the high school textbooks or 
elect a legislature that will vote for more restrictive laws on abortion and 
gay marriage. If only 30% of the people vote, 16% will be sufficient to 
accomplish your purpose.
   While the candid emphasis on electoral strategy is perhaps new, there 
is nothing unusual in American history about religious groups using 
politics in the hope of social transformation. The abolition of slavery, the 
campaigns to prohibit alcoholic beverages, the civil rights movement, and 
a variety of anti-war movements have had their roots in religion. Most 
often, these movements begin with a heavy emphasis on direct action and 
personal transformation. People take to the streets as evidence that their 
own hearts and minds have been changed. But there is a limit on what 
direct action can accomplish, and most American reform movements have 
at some point decided that it would be nice to have the coercive power of 
law to complete what moral transformation leaves undone.
   It is a strategy that religious activists have turned to since the days of 
abolitionism, for both liberal and conservative causes, and for all sorts of 
goals. It was not Ralph Reed who said most clearly what politics as an 
instrument of moral reformation is all about. It was Walter Rauschenbusch, 
a German immigrant, Baptist preacher, and the great theologian of the 
Social Gospel. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Rauschenbusch 
surveyed America’s political and social landscape and declared that what 
we have today is a society that makes good people do bad things. Poverty 
and lack of education lead to crime, abuse, and addiction. Profit motives 
lead employers to exploit their workers and enrich themselves by 
persuading people to buy things that they do not really need. What we 
12) Ralph Reed, Active Faith: How Christians are Changing the Soul of American Poli-
tics (New York: Free Press, 1996).
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need is a society that will make bad people do good things, a society 
where laws will compel selfish people to think about the common good 
and ensure that greedy people can only get rich by inventing new ways to 
meet real human needs.13)
   This is in some ways a peculiarly American idea, with a characteristically 
American confidence that good intentions and good organization always 
lead to good results. But it also reflects an older, theological conviction that 
forms one of the two poles of American religious life: Political power in the 
hands of the right people is an instrument of God’s purposes.
The Enduring Alternatives
So the problem of religion and politics in the United States does not arise 
from the constitutional separation of church and state, nor is it a problem 
about the particular questions of religious freedom and government 
entanglement that are constantly being argued in our courts. Those 
questions will always be with us, but the law provides a framework for 
settling them as they arise. Civil religion, likewise, exerts a pervasive 
influence on American life, providing a shared treasury of myths and 
heroes and elevating national ideals and achievements to universal 
significance. The effects of civil religion are, however, ambiguous. It can be 
a unifying force that transcends political differences, but in times of deep 
ideological division, it can also become contested territory, as each party 
claims the legitimating power of civil religion for itself and attempts to 
exclude the others from it.
   The central, recurrent problem of religion and politics in America is 
found in the sharply divided understandings of politics that are built into 
the history of American religion. On one hand, there is the American 
suspicion of and separation from politics derived from the radical 
Reformation. On the other hand, there is the American conviction, which 
13) Walter Rauschenbusch, Christianizing the Social Order (New York: Macmillan, 
1913); Gary Dorrien, Social Ethics in the Making: Interpreting an American 
Tradition (Boston: Wiley-Blackwell 2008), 99-104.
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goes far beyond any European ideas about a state church, that a people 
shaped by religious values can become God’s people, and their society can 
become God’s kingdom on earth.
   Both of those ideas are part of the Christian tradition, but they are 
difficult to reconcile theologically and even more difficult to reconcile 
politically. American politics is sharply divided today, not just because 
Americans disagree about questions of policy, but because they have a 
disagreement that is at its root a religious disagreement about what the 
nation and its government is for. Is the state the result of human sin, 
something that good people should not rely on and something they should 
avoid as far as possible? That was what the sectarian Protestants believed, 
and many Americans today believe the same thing, even if they do not 
understand where those ideas came from. Or is the state an instrument of 
God’s purposes, which God’s people can use to create a society that will be 
an example for the rest of the world? That is what the Puritans who 
founded the colonies in New England believed, and today, too, many 
Americans believe that, even if they do not understand where those ideas 
came from.
   Indeed, political strategists in America today are fascinated by the way 
that the religious right used the idea of religious commitment so effectively 
during the 1990s. They have abandoned the strategies of compromise that 
used to win elections by seeking the middle ground and bringing large 
numbers of voters to the polls. Instead, they seek to mobilize a “base,” a 
core group of voters who believe in their cause with something like a 
religious commitment. In effect, the new strategy is to turn your own 
voters into fervent believers in politics as a tool of God’s will, while 
provoking your opponents into sectarian withdrawal. Politics, which used 
to be defined as “the art of the possible,” depends now on the appearance 
of ultimacy. This is something that could only have happened in America, 
with its unique religious history. It is certainly quite different from the 
politics of consensus that prevails over ideological differences in Japan, 
and it is equally different from the secular divisions between Left and 
Right that are found in Europe.
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   It seems, then, that in order to prevent our politics from becoming 
permanently polarized into competing ideological commitments or 
collapsing into sectarian withdrawal, Americans must turn to a religious 
perspective that allows us to take politics seriously on its own terms. We 
must learn to see politics not as an ultimate decision, but as a continuing 
task. The theologian Reinhold Niebuhr outlined that approach to politics 
over fifty years ago, in the midst of a Cold War when global politics was 
polarized between Western democracy and Soviet communism. Then, as 
now, there were those who wanted to withdraw from that conflict into a 
sort of sectarian neutrality. And there were those, especially in America, 
who saw the conflict as a religious choice, in which Christian commitment 
and American interests led to the same conclusion.
   Niebuhr, by contrast, suggested that what faith provides is not the 
answer, but a set of questions that can be posed to all of the competing 
ideologies:
We have now come to the fairly general conclusion that there is no 
“Christian” economic or political system. But there is a Christian 
attitude toward all systems and schemes of justice. It consists on the 
one hand of a critical attitude toward the claims of all systems and 
schemes, expressed in the question whether they will contribute to 
justice in the concrete situation; and on the other hand a responsible 
attitude, which will not pretend to be God nor refuse to make a 
decision between political answers to a problem because each answer 
is discovered to contain a moral ambiguity in God’s sight. We are 
men, not God; we are responsible for making choices between 
greater and lesser evils, even when our Christian faith, illuminating 
the human scene, makes it quite apparent that there is no pure good 
in history; and probably no pure evil, either.14)
14) Reinhold Niebuhr, “Theology and Political Thought in the Western World,” 
The Ecumenical Review 9 (1957): 253-254.
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Political choices are religiously significant. That is why a secular approach 
to church and state that attempts to eliminate conflict by completely 
separating religious commitment from political participation will not 
work. The American understanding of religious freedom has always 
allowed citizens to speak freely on behalf of moral choices that they 
believed their faith required.
   What Niebuhr’s Christian realism reminds us, however, is that ultimate 
moral and religious commitments do not translate simply or directly into 
policy choices. It is in the nature of politics that its questions remain open 
and have to be revisited again and again, as we learn the actual results of 
our choices and see the unintended consequences of our previous 
decisions. Because politics is about limited choices made by imperfect 
people, one of the most important parts of the political task is making sure 
that those who come after us will have the resources to understand our 
mistakes, the opportunities to assess them in open discussion, and the 
freedom to correct them. Freedom of religion has been an important part 
of maintaining that critical and responsible attitude toward political 
decisions throughout American history. But the role of the theologians 
may be even more important today than it was when Niebuhr wrote those 
lines about being critical and responsible in the midst of the Cold War. If 
American politicians are no longer able to teach us what politics is, then 
our theologians must at least remind us that politics is not theology.
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Abstract
   The legal status of religion everywhere reflects the development of 
religious traditions and institutions, shared cultural experiences, and 
prevailing ideas about law, government, and individual freedom. While 
the United States is often presented as a guide to reconciling the demands 
of democracy, diversity, and religious commitment, it is not a universal 
ideal, or even a model for all developed democracies. The American 
experience is a unique combination of Enlightenment politics, Protestant 
Christianity, and constitutional democracy that is unlikely to be repeated. 
The historical interaction of those elements, however, offers important 
insights into contemporary American politics and may suggest realistic 
ways to understand the relationship between religion, law, and society in 
other contexts.
